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THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE IN WEST VIRGINIA

By

JAmEs W.

SIMONTON*

N 1849 the Legislature of Virginia passed the following act
which is today a part of the Code of West Virginia :1
"Where any estate, real or personal is given by deed or will
to any person for his life, and after his death to his heirs, or
to the heirs of his body, the conveyance shall be construed to
vest an estate for life only in such person, and a remainder in
fee simple in his heirs or the heirs of his body."
The probable intent in passing this statute was to abolish that
legal antique known as the rule in Shelley's Case, but, since such
laudable purpose was only partially accomplished, a much more
comprehensive statute was passed in Virginia 2 in 1887 and now
this aged and useless rule, is effectually abrogated in that jurisdietion. Similar action ought to be taken in West Virginia so as
to rid the State forever of this ancient feudal doctrine, which a
judge in a sister state has termed, 3-- "the Don Quixote of the
law, which like the last knight errant of chivalry, has long survived every cause which gave it birth, and now wanders aimlessly
through the reports, still vigorous, but equally useless, and
dangerous"
The following statement of the rule in Shelley's Case will serve
to give an idea as to how far the above statute actually abolishes
4
the doctrine:
"If, after a limitation to a person of an estate of freehold,
there be limited, by the same instrument, an estate in the
form of a remainder to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, he
will, at common law, take an estate in remainder in fee or in
tail, according to the class of heirs specified, and the freehold
estate previously limited to him will merge therein, unless
there be another estate interposed which will prevent merger."
Probably few defenders of the rule in Shelley's Case can now
be found among the members of the bench and bar. Professor
*Professcr of Law, West Virginia University.
1W. VA. CODE, c. 71, §11.
2VA. CODE, 1904, §2423.
$Douglas, J., in Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C. 251, 28 S. E. 20 (1897).
'This is taken from TIFPANY ON REAL PROPERTY, 308.
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Minor, who favored the rule in Shelley's Case, gave four reasons
for it," three of which have long been obsolete. The fourth is that
the rule in Shelley's Case prevents the non-alienability of the inheritance during the ancestor's life time; that is, if the rule applies, the ancestor would have a fee, while if it were abolished, he
would have only a life estate followed, either mediately or immediately, by a contingent remainder in his heirs or the heirs of his
body, which remainder, of course, would be inalienable prior to the
termination of the life estate. The rule accomplishes this by arbitrarily defeating the intention of the grantor or testator,6 his
intention being to create two estates, both of which are perfectly
proper, lawful and not contrary to public policy, and both of
which he could create by using different phraseology. This fourth
reason, therefore, seems to have little or no force at the present
time and it is difficult to see any other reason for retaining the
rule in Shelley's Case unless because there is a sporting chance
that some grantors or testators will so express themselves as to give
rise to a law suit which will inure to the benefit of a worthy
profession.
It is evident that the present West Virginia statute only partially
abolishes the rule in Shelley's Case, for it does not apply unless an
estate is given to the ancestor for his own life, thus excluding any
case where such freehold is of any other character, as, for example,
an estate pur autre vie. In a recent case 7 the Supreme Court of
Appeals has still further limited the application of this statute by
holding that, not only must the freehold estate in the ancestor
be for his own life, but that the estate given to his heirs or to the
heirs of his body, must be so limited as to take effect immediately
on the termination of the life estate. The statute as thus construed
would read, "When any estate, real or personal is given by deed
or will to any person for his life, and [immediately] after his death
to his heirs, or to the heirs of his body, . . ." It would have been
possible to have construed the statute to mean that if the estate were
given to his heirs or to the heirs of his body, to take effect at any
time after the termination of the life estate in the ancestor, this
would be within the meaning of the statute. Since the rule in
Shelley's Case is one which almost invariably defeats the lawful intention of the grantor or testator one is inclined to regret
52 MINoR's INsTruTms, pp. 402-4.
rule is a rule of law and not of construction and will operate no matter
Gle
how clearly the grantor or testator expresses his intention that the ancestor Is
to have merely a life estate. See TnFANY, REAi, PRoPERTY, 313-16.

Carter v. Reserve Gas Co., 100 S. E. 738 (W. Va. 1919).
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that a more liberal view did not prevail. However, the statute is
so imperfect that it ought to be repealed and an effective one
substituted.
It is submitted that the court in the principal case construed
the statute more strictly than it did in Irvin v. Stover s and that
that decision is inconsistent with the decision in the principal case.
The facts of the principal case in so far as they concern the rule
in Shelley's Case are briefly these. A father by deed conveyed
certain land to his two sons, "To have and to hold the lands so
long as they, the said parties of the second part, shall live, with a
remainder to their heirs forever, and, in case of the death of either
of the said parties of the second part, said land shall be vested in
the other of said parties during his life, with remainder as aforesaid." One son left the state without paying any part of the consideration for the conveyance and the father by suit in equity had
this son's interest sold and the father himself became the purchaser, receiving a deed for the same on March 18, 1871. On March
24, 1871 the other son conveyed all his right, title and interest to
the father. The question was whether by these two deeds the
father got merely a life estate for the joint lives of the sons, or
whether he got a fee simple in the land. The court held that, by
the operation of the rule in Shelley's Case, the sons took estates
in fee simple and therefore the father by the above conveyances
got title in fee simple. After pointing out the fact that, under
the statutes and decisions of this State, the two sons took joint
estates for life with right of survivorship and did not take as tenants in common, the court 9 said:
"The life tenants were seized per mie et per tout. Each of
them had a concurrent interest in the whole of the land, not a
life estate in a moiety of it, and it could not be divested by
the death of his companion. Bl. Com. bk. 2, p. 184. In consequence of this, the heirs of one might or might not have
taken immediately after him. It was certain that one set
would so take and that the other would not, but altogether
uncertain which set of heirs would be in either situation. The
statute contemplates a taking by a person for his life and after
his death by his heirs. Here one set of heirs were bound to
take after a person of whom they were not heirs. Hence the
case does not fall within the terms of the statute, even though
it may be within its spirit."
867 W. Va. 356, 67 S. E. 1119 (1910)
9See HoG's W. VA. CODE, 1913. §§3756 and 3757, and annotations.
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The idea expressed here seems to be that the estate in the heirs
or the heirs of the body, as the case may be, must be so limited
that it will be certain to take effect immediately on the death of the
ancestor, and if there is any possible contigency which might prevent this, the case does not fall within the statute. In Irvin v.
Stover, there was a conveyance to a husband and wife, "to be held
by them as a homestead for themselves, and after them to their
heirs." The court held this gave to husband and wife an estate by
entirety for their lives, and that, under the statute above quoted,
the respective heirs of the husband and of the wife would take contingent remainders in fee simple. It is clear that the heirs of the
husband and the heirs of the wife might be the same persons or
might be different sets of persons, just as in the principal case the
heirs of the two brothers might be the same persons or different
persons. Therefore, one set of heirs might take after one of whom
they are not heirs, and the remainder to the heirs will therefore
not necessarily take effect immediately on the death of the ancestor.
So far the cases are similar. The court distinguished them on a
very technical ground, namely, that the husband and wife held
per tout et non per mie (by the whole and not by the moiety)
while the two sons in the principal case held per mie et per tout
(by the moiety or by the whole). Per mie et per tout means the
mode in which joint tenants hold the joint estate. 10 For purposes
of tenure and survivorship each is holder of the whole, but for
purposes of alienation each has only his own share, which is presumed by law to be equal. Per tout et non per mie refers to the
holding by entirety by a husband and his wife."- They hold by
entirety, that is, eaeh is holder of the whole in all respects. The
only apparent difference between the manner in which joint tenants hold, and the manner in which tenants by entirety hold, is in
respect to the power of alienation. The joint tenant could alienate his share while the tenant by entirety could not (husband and
wife being in law one person) but, so long as the joint tenant had
not alienated, he held the whole estate just as in the case of the
tenant by entirety. Hence in so far as the application of the statute in question is concerned, it would seem that there can be no
"See BLACIKS LAw DICTIONARY; BOUVIER'S LAW DICTI6NARY; 2 BL. Co3.
TlvrAzy REAL PROPERTY, 370-3.
USee
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY; BOUViER'S
LAW DICTIONARY; 2
DL.

182;
COM.

182; TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 379-81.
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clear distinction between the principal case and Irvin v. Stover
and that the latter case is in effect overruled by the former.
The important thing is not so much how the present inadequate
statute shall be construed but whether the Legislature can be prevailed upon to pass a statute which will effectually abolish this
ancient relic of feudal times. The writer suggests that the statute
now in force in Virginia' 2 might be taken as it stands except that
it would be well to add to the end of it the following clause: "It
being the intent of this provision to abrogate the rule of law commonly known as the rule in Shelley's Case." If this clause were
added there would be no room for doubt as to the legislative intent. In the opinion in the principal case the Court said in respect to the present statute, "If it had been the legislative purpose
wholly to abrogate the common-law rule, it could have been abolished by name, for it was well known, or by the use of terms broad
enough to include every case falling within it." The safe way is
to abolish it both by name and by the use of terms broad enough
to include every case falling within it. Another excellent draft
of an act which would certainly be effective is the following one
which was prepared some years ago by Professor Ernst Freund
of the University of Chicago Law School:
*Where any grant or devise hereafter taking effect of any
property shall limit an estate for life or of freehold to any
person and an estate in remainder [either mediately or immediately] to the heirs (or heirs of any particular description)
of such person, such person shall not be deemed to take an
estate of inheritance, and the persons who, upon the taking
effect of such remainder in possession, shall be the heirs (or
the heirs of the class described as the same may be) of such
person, shall take by virtue of the remainder so limited to
them: it being the intent of this provision to abrogate the rule
of law commonly known as the rule in Shelley's Case.
Since the decision in the principal case has called attention to
the fact that the rule in Shelley's Case still lives, it is to be hoped
that action will shortly be taken completely to abrogate it. The
passage of either of the forms proposed would, it is believed, prove
effective.
2
1 The words in brackets in the above draft were aidded by the writer in order
tc prevent the possibility of a construction such as was put upon the existing
rtatute in the principal case.
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